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LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW-1957 TENNESSEE SURVEY
THOMAS G. ROADY, JR.* and ROBERT L. WHITE**

The substantial amount of litigation involving local governmental
units, their officers and agents, continued during the period covered
by this survey and if volume alone were any indication of significant
growth and development in a given area of law this survey article
would be of considerable importance. But, in general, the cases decided in this period draw on fairly well established legal rules and
principles or upon legislation which has been designed to clarify
existing problems. In view of this fact it does not appear justifiable
to do much more than to present a summary of these decisions with
brief observations as to those that depart from the established pattern.
The activity of the Eightieth General Assembly should also be
noted at this point. During this session of the legislature some 411
Public Acts were passed and a large percentage of this number had
some effect upon local governments in Tennessee. The number and
range of these many acts are so great that no attempt will be made
to comment on them separately. One can only fully appreciate the
scope of the local governmental problems facing the legislative body
by reading this flood of legislation. This is made understandable by
the fact that governmental activity on all levels continues to increase
and to touch each inhabitant of the state more and more often and in
more and more places, coupled with the fact that local governments
are creatures of the legislature' and the parent is faced not just with
the problem of adjusting relationships between the local units and
the people but with the more complex and difficult problem of settling
the increasing number of disputes between their offsprings. Some of
the most significant legislation in this area was devoted to the general
problem of adjusting relationships between local governmental units.2
Private Act v. General Act: In Algee v. State3 the Supreme Court
of Tennessee affirmed a judgment of ouster entered by the Chancery
Court of Lake County in a quo warranto action against certain members of the County Board of Education of that county. The question
presented was whether or not a general statute providing for the
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Illinois and Tennessee
Bars.
** LL.B., Vanderbilt University, August 1957.

1. 2 McQumUN,

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 4.04 (3d ed. 1949).

2. See, e.g., Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 120 §§ 1-22; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-3701
to -3723 (Supp. 1957). This legislation's stated purpose is to authorize and
provide for the creation and functioning of metropolitan governments in
counties with population in excess of 200,000 or more according to the Federal
Census of 1950.
3. 290 S.W.2d 869 (Tenn. 1956).
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qualifications of members of boards of education 4 should be applied
in this case in view of the fact that a private act passed in 1929,
applicable to Lake County alone, was still in existence, and under
its provisions the defendants would have been qualified for office.
The Supreme Court logically concluded that this private act violated
article 11, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution and under the general act defendants were ineligible to hold the office.
There were three other decisions during the survey period wherein
the inquiry concerned the validity of private acts of the legislature
when challenged by those who contended that a general law was
applicable. In Freshour v. McCanless5 the Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment of the Cocke County Court sustaining a private act
fixing the salary of the clerk of the general sessions court in that
county. The court reiterated the oft cited proposition that nothing
prohibits the legislature from enacting special legislation affecting
a particular county or municipality in its political or governmental
capacity so long as such act is not contrary to the provisions of a
general law. Since there was no general law governing salaries of
general session court clerks, it was proper for the legislature to
provide for such by special act.
In Memphis v. Yellow Cab, Inc. 6 the Supreme Court found that a
private act and an ordinance enacted by the city of Memphis pursuant
thereto placing a $60 per year tax on taxi cabs for use of the street
were unconstitutional and void. The primary defect again was that
these acts operated to suspend a general law declaring that the
licensing of motor vehicles belong exclusively to the state.
In Shelby County v. Hale7 the Supreme Court climaxed a number of
persuasive and enlightened opinions in this area when it held that a
private act changing the salary of the commissioners of Shelby County
was unconstitutional and void because it conflicted with article 11,
section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. The specific portion of this
section violated was the second paragraph which is the sixth amendment, popularly known as the "Home Rule" amendment. The opinion
in this case is a vital blow in support of the principle of home rule
and gives the sixth amendment a scope and vitality in keeping with
the spirit and intent of those who drafted and supported it.8
In reaching a conclusion that avoided the denuding effect of the
interpretation given the amendment by the chancellors of Shelby
4. TENx. CODE ANN. § 49-209 (1956). This statute precluded members of the
quarterly county court and other county officials from membership on county
boards of education. It was stipulated in the case that defendants were
members of the County Court of Lake County.
5. 292 S.W.2d 705 (Tenn. 1956).
6. 296 S.W.2d 864 (Tenn. 1956).
7. 292 S.W.2d 745 (Tenn. 1956).

8. Id. at 748.
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County sitting in banc the Supreme Court relied upon two well established and logical rules of legislative construction. The first of these
is that a statute should be construed so as to give effect to all of its
provisions and the second is that where legislative intent is in doubt
the history of the act or constitution should be examined to find the
intent of the framers. This intent, when found, should be given effect.
An application of these principles resulted in an interpretation of the
sixth amendment which deprives the legislature completely of power
to pass a special, local or private act having the effect of removing
an incumbent from any municipal or county office or abridging the
term or altering the salary prior to the end of the term for which
such public officer was selected. This may well be a landmark decision
and spells the end of "ripper bills" in this jurisdiction.
Elections: A decision based on a rather technical point in pleading
was made by the Supreme Court in a case brought by the defeated
candidate for the office of sheriff in the 1954 Jackson County election.9
The successful candidate and the election commissioners, all defendants, filed demurrers to the petition for contest and the Supreme Court
held that these demurrers should have been sustained. The petition
was fatally defective in that it contained no allegation to the effect
that the election was a valid one. Citing a prior opinion, the court
stated that in order to maintain an election contest, the contestant
must allege facts which show that the election was valid and that he
received a majority of ballots cast by qualified voters. 10 As an alternative basis for the decision reversing the judgment below for contestant,
the court pointed out that it is error to declare an election void where
after hearing all the evidence it appears that there has been a valid
expression of the people's will and one of the candidates has been
elected. This result follows even though there have been irregularities.
In Bohr v. Abercrombie" the Supreme Court affirmed the Chancellor
of the Chancery Court of Hamilton County who had sustained defendant's demurrer to a bill challenging the validity of an election
wherein voters of a municipality had adopted a city manager-commission form of government. The court felt that all voters had been
given an opportunity to vote; that, even though there was nothing in
the record to establish compliance with Code section 6-1804 requiring
election petitions to be signed by twenty per cent of legal voters,
this evidenced at most an informality insufficient to invalidate the
election; 12 and that, as the permanent registration of voters law 13
was in effect, the statute requiring special registration in the city9. Mathis v. Young, 291 S.W.2d 592 (Tenn. 1956).
10. Nelson v. Sneed, 112 Tenn. 36, 83 S.W. 786,(1903).
11. 292 S.W.2d 38 (Tenn. 1956).
12. TENN.CODE ANN.§ 6-2008 (1956).
13. Id. § 2-301 (1956).

1130

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.. 10

manager commission elections 14 had no substantial bearing on the outcome of the election and failure to follow it was not error. It was
implied that this section is no longer a valid requirement of law.
In State v. Town of Greenville 5 petitioners were owners of property
just outside the city limits of the town of Greenville. They brought
their action to prevent annexation of their property to the town as
a suit in the nature of quo warranto provided for by statute. 16 The
decision involves primarily the construction of the annexation statute
and the court felt that the legislature obviously did not have in mind
applying all the provisions of the quo warranto statute to this annexation statute providing for an action "in the nature of quo warranto."
Where the two statutes differ, the annexation statute can still be
given effect and aggrieved property owners can file this suit even
though quo warranto can only be brought by the Attorney General.
Reapportionment: In Kidd v. McCanless'7 the Supreme Court faced
the very difficult and perplexing question of what to do when it appears that the General Assembly has failed to comply with the constitutional requirement that it reapportion the state every ten years.
In this suit for a judgment declaring the 1901 apportionment statute
unconstitutional the court reversed the chancellor's holding that the
act was unconstitutional, stating that this must be the rule in the
absence of a showing that there is a prior act to fall back on. Nowhere,
of course, does the court indicate any sympathy or approval of the
failure to act on the part of the legislature. The decision rather indicates a refusal by the court to enter an area so fraught with difficulty
and so highly charged with politics. Relief from this situation can
be obtained only through political processes and they are rendered
less workable by the very failure of the legislature to discharge its
responsibility.
The case presents an interesting discussion of the de facto officer
doctrine pointing out that it cannot be relied on to maintain the
present General Assembly because after it is once determined that
the present body is not a de jure government, the members would
have no color of authority and therefore could not serve as de facto
officers.
In Davidson County v. Harmon18 the Supreme Court affirmed the
decree of Chancellor Steele of Davidson County sustaining a demurrer
to a suit by Davidson County to enjoin construction of a five story
building adjacent to the Nashville Municipal Airport. It was contended that this building would exceed the height permitted by the
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. § 6-1805 (1956).
297 S.W.2d 68 (Tenn. 1956).
TNN. CODE ANN. § 6-310 (Supp. 1957).
292 S.W.2d 40 (Tenn. 1956).

18. 292 S.W.2d 777 (Tenn. 1956).
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zoning code of Davidson County. In this case the state was engaged
in erecting the building at the Central State Hospital to be used in
the treatment of patients at that institution. The court considered
afresh this question which has over the years stirred much controversy
and supported by ample authority recommitted itself to the rule that
a municipal or local zoning ordinance does not bind the state unless
the state legislature has expressly so provided. The principle of
sovereign immunity is well established in this area. 19
Distribution of Taxes: A controversy between counties and cities
over the right to part of the gasoline tax collected on the storage of
aviation gas sold to the United States for use by the Air Force was
decided in favor of the counties by Chancellor Steele of Davidson
County and the Supreme Court affirmed his decree. 20 The case involved a construction of several sections of the Tennessee Code and
general rules for construing statutes were followed.
CITIES

McCanless21

certain taxpayers in Hamilton County chalIn Witt v.
lenged the validity of Chapter 113 of the Public Acts of 195522 on
the ground that it violated article II section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution in that the act embraced more than one subject, the subject
was not expressed in the title, and it purported to repeal, revive or
amend former laws without proper reference to them and further
violated article II, section 1 in that it attempted to delegate legislative
authority to the courts. The Supreme Court affirmed the decree below
sustaining the act holding that the statute had but one general object or purpose which was adequately expressed in the title and that
the statute in conferring on the court authority to determine reasonableness of an annexation ordinance was not delegating legislative
authority but merely recognizing a power that was necessarily committed to the courts.
The case of Callahanv. Town of Middleton23 is discussed elsewhere
in this issue. 24 In that case it was pointed out that a municipality
cannot escape liability for the taking of private property within the
corporate limits for a public purpose when it constructs or permits
others to construct a public highway. It is no defense to show that the
county and state were constructing a highway out of their own funds
or in conjunction with the federal government. The fact that the city
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.15 (3d ed. 1957).
20. Nashville v. Gibson County, 298 S.W.2d 540 (Tenn. 1956).

19. 8 McQuILmi,

21. 292 S.W.2d 392 (Tenn. 1956).
22. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-309 to -311 (Supp. 1957).
23. 292 S.W.2d 501 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).

24. Roady, Real Property-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L. REv. 1188,

1193-94 (1957).
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is not contributing to the cost is immaterial. The city'does not thereby
lose its right in the streets nor can it escape liability for the taking of
the private property for a public use. A number of cases are cited in
support of this proposition,
A municipal ordinance of the City of Pulaski prohibiting the construction of underground gasoline storage tanks with a capacity in
excess of 1,100 gallons was challenged successfully by an independent
gasoline dealer. Reversing the decree below for the city, the Supreme
Court said the ordinance was discriminatory and violated article I,
section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution.25 The defect arose from the
fact that the ordinance permitted persons already using such tanks
to continue doing so while prohibiting all others.
This is' a most interesting decision. The court observed that the
subject matter of this ordinance was well within the police power
and apparently it was conceded that the ordinance would be valid
as an initial proposition. But conceding all this, if the municipality
decides to regulate in the interest of public safety, it cannot exclude
some persons from engaging in business while allowing others to do
so. There is considerable authority for this proposition but one must
be careful to recognize, as the court did, that zoning regulations may
be approached differently. The continuance of existing uses may be
permitted in zoning ordinances, but if the reasonableness of a police
regulation depends upon the prohibited use being dangerous to the
community, where the danger is as real with respect to existing as
it is to future uses it is not reasonable to permit one and prohibit the
other.
The case is one of first impression on the point involved. The court
cited authority from other jurisdictions 26 in support of the distinction
made between zoning and other police regulations. But basically the
test to be applied to all police ordinances is the same and where there
is classification or different treatment awarded individuals there must
be a reasonable basis for the classification.
Another example ofan inquiry into the reasonableness of an exercise by a legislative authority of the police power is the case of
Starr v. Nashville Housing Authority27 wherein the court held that
the Nashville Housing Authority had not acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in- requiring the 'eliminations of petitioner's theater and
office buildings as. part of a ,slum clearance project. This result
followed even though the buildings were structurally sound and not
,
"ns'anita!y
unsightly or
25. Consumers Gasoline Station4',v. City of Pulaski, 292 S.W.2d 735 (Tenn.
1956).
26.
T
1956)
27. 1dSpt
145 F. 737.
Supp. 498 .D.
(M.DJ. Tenn.
1956).•.,
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Contract Liability: An interesting opinion during thesurvey period
supports the general proposition that a city is liable for breach of
its valid contractual obligations as it well 'should be.28 The City of
Springfield, proceeding under the authority granted in the"Industrial
Building Revenue Bond Act of 1951,29 contracted with plaintiff for the
purchase of certain real estate conditioned upon bonds being voted
and the city being able to enter into lease agreement with a manufacturer at rental sufficient to pay the bonds. This condition was
satisfied but the manufacturer later backed out on his agreement to
lease. This did not excuse the city from performance of its obligation
to plaintiff. While industrial development is desirable and beneficial,
city officials are well advised to proceed with caution in committing
the city by contract in the business of attracting industry. Sometimes
the price is too high.
Tort Liability: There were a number of decisions during the survey
period wherein the tort liability of municipalities was in issue. These
decisions are discussed elsewhere in this survey 30 and no attempt to
analyze them will be made here. In Murray v. Nashvile 31 the court
of appeals held that a plaintiff who crossed a street at a point other
than a crosswalk in violation of a city ordinance was guilty of negligence per se and could not recover for injuries sustained when he
slipped and fell in a shallow, unmarked depression in the street. In
Chattanooga v. Rogers, 32 the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment in
favor of the administrator of a deceased workman who was electrocuted when a crane came in contact with city's uninsulated power
line. The court held that the question of the city's negligence was for
the jury.
For years now the number of decisions holding cities liable in tort
for the so-called "sidewalk injuries" has been increasing.3 Some
jurisdictions have reached the point of imposing almost absolute
liability on the city for such injuries.34 City of Winchester v. Finchum3 5 portrays this general tendency to impose liability. In this case
a judgment for plaintiff who. had been injured when the bicycle she
was riding on the sidewalk struck a broken slab of concrete causing
her to be thrown to the sidewalk. The Supreme Court held that the
question of defendant's negligence in failing to repair the defective
sidewalk was for the jury. The city holds its public ways and side28. Springfield Tobacco Redryers Corp. v. City of Springfield, 293 S.W.2d
189 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
29. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-1701 to -1716 (1956).
30. See Wade, Torts-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L. REV. 1218 (1957).
31. 299 S.W.2d 859 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
32. 299 S.W.2d 660 (Tenn. 1956).
•33. 19 McQULLIN,

MUNICIPAL CORPORATI6NS

4§ 54.01-.04 (3d ed. 1950).

34. See Swenson v. City of Rockford, 136 N.E.2d 777 (Ill. 1956).
35. 301 S.W.2d 341 (Tenn. 1957).
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walks in a proprietary or corporate capacity and cannot divest itself
of its duty to keep such walks reasonably safe by an ordinance imposing upon each property owner the duty to construct and maintain
them. The case is indicative of the strong tendency to find liability.
For, while plaintiff was riding on the sidewalk in violation of an ordinance prohibiting such use and was, therefore, guilty of negligence
per se, the court said this did not prevent a recovery in the absence
of a showing that her negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury. In this age city officials would do well to insure against such
liability.
SCHOOLS

Teacher Tenure: While under the teacher tenure law a Board of
Education retains the right and authority to transfer teachers within
the system for the "good of the schools" and can effect such transfer
by a majority vote without approval of the Superintendent, this authority to transfer is not unlimited. If on the facts, a Board has abused
its authority and acted in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner, its
action is subject to judicial review and the court will not allow the
purpose of the tenure statute to be defeated by the arbitrary action
of a Board of Education. In State v. Yoakum 36 the injunction restraining the Claiborne County Board of Education from transferring
approximately eighty teachers who had acquired tenure status to
remote places in some instances eighty miles from their homes contrary to the recommendation of the Superintendent was affirmed.
Teacher Salaries: The invalidation of the General Education Bill
of 1951 was a blow to the financial expectations of many teachers and
this was particularly true if they had in some way been deprived of
the benefits of the act of 1949. Certain teachers in the public schools
of McMinn County sued to recover the same amount of salaries for
employment during 1949-51 as they received during 1948-49. Their
contention was that the attempted repeal of the 1949 education bill
was ineffective due to the invalidation of the 1951 act and that according to the 1949 act current salaries should not be less than the
amount received during 1948-49 plus the difference between the
state salary schedule for the prior year and the schedule set by the
Board of Education for the next biennium, notwithstanding the fact
that a contract for the minimum salary provided by the law had been
signed by each of the teachers. The court held that the prior valid
act of 1949 was in full force and was not effected by the specific provision for repeal in the invalidated act of 1951. Since the contract
signed by the teachers incorporates general law, the act of 1949 gov36. 297 S.W.2d 635 (Tenn. 1956).
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erns the minimum amount of salaries notwithstanding a contract

provision to the contrary. 37

MISCELLANEOUS

Boards and Commissions: In Chanaberry v. Gordy8 the court held
that the action of the Knox County Beer Board in revoking a beer
permit at a meeting not attended by the holder, and after the holder
had been advised no action would be taken at the meeting was clearly
arbitrary. It further appeared that one member of the board voted
for the revocation even though he had not heard the evidence. In
view of a stipulation by the parties, the court said that the matter
should have been referred back to the Board for final action.
In Jones v. Sullivan County Beer Board39 the court affirmed the
revocation of a wholesale beer permit because the holder sold beer
at retail on premises within 2,000 feet of a church in Sullivan County
in violation of a statute and because it found this created a private
and public nuisance. The action of the Beer Committee was challenged
on the basis that one of the committeemen was not properly elected.
The court held that on the facts the Beer Committee of Sullivan
County was at least a de facto committee and the election of its member could be challenged only in the quarterly court directly, not
collaterally as in this proceeding.
Compensation of Attorneys: In a somewhat novel opinion the court
decided that a county was not liable for the attorney fees claimed
by those who represented a temporarily appointed county judge in
quo warranto proceedings instituted against him by the district Attorney General. The court admitted that they would like very much to
see the attorneys compensated but since there was no statute imposing liability in such a case on the county, the county did not
owe the money and had no power to pay the claim.
The question of just when and under what conditions a municipal
corporation is liable and can pay for attorney fees incurred by officials
who are forced to defend their acts or their right to office is a knotty
one and it is difficult to rationalize all of the cases. The test often is
in terms of a question as to the exact nature of the interest of the
municipality in the outcome of the suit. Where the suit is against the
individual officer in his official capacity or arises out of the performance by him of some official power, right, duty, or obligation attaching to the office, it is generally held that the municipality may compensate his attorneys. But where the suit is viewed as directed against
37. McMinn County Board of Education v. Anderson, 292 S.W.2d
(Tenn. 1956).
38. 292 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1956).
39. 292 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. 1956).
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the officer as an individual, then it is generally held that the
municipality has no obligation to pay his attorneys and, in fact, a
payment would likely be held to involve the expenditure of funds for
other than a "public purpose." In this case the court views a quo
warranto action as essentially one against defendant officer as an
individual and even though the county may receive some benefit from
the services of attorneys defending, the county is not liable for such
services.
Attorneys who had performed services for local governmental
officers also came off second best on their claim for compensation in
another case decided during the survey period.40 In this decision the
Supreme Court construed chapter 183 of the Private Acts of 1937
as conferring on the County Commission of Knox County authority to
control the issuance and revocation of beer permits in Knox County.
In this action for declaratory judgment the court gave added emphasis to its holding in Troutman v. Crippen 41 where it had pointed
out the broad power of the legislature over the reorganization of
county government by stating in effect that the 1937 Private Act was
effective in transferring all power formerly held by the quarterly court
"except with reference to schools and the constitutional matters provided for in the Quarterly Court. '42 But while the decision affirmed
the exercise of this power by the Knox County Board of Commissioners, it denied that the Board had authority to employ special
counsel at the expense of Knox County to represent it in the declaratory judgment action. This result was dictated by a statute which
provided the method to be used by boards and commissions in Knox
County in employing counsel. Since this method was not followed,
the employment was beyond the authority of the Board and Knox
County is not liable for their services.
Pensions:As a general rule, laws creating the right to pensions are
liberally construed so as to carry out the intent and policy of legislative bodies in adopting them. During the survey period the Supreme
Court had occasion to construe the comprehensive pension and retirement ordinance of the city of Memphis and in a decision affirming the
Chancery Court of Shelby County the above rule was applied, and a
retiring member of the city police force was found to be entitled under
the ordinance to credit for service in the armed forces during World
War II even though he had accepted employment as a deputy sheriff
for a twenty-nine day period between his resignation to enter the
service and the actual date of his commission.43 One cannot quarrel
40. Bayless v. Maynard, 292 S.W.2d 774 (Tenn. 1956).
41. 186 Tenn. 459, 212 S.W.2d 33 (1937).

42. Bayless v. Maynard, 292 S.W.2d 774, 776 (Tenn. 1956).
43. Raney v. Board of Administration of the Retirement System of Memphis,
298 S.W.2d 729 (Tenn. 1957).
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with the rules applied nor with what appears to be a just and equitable result but, in this case, the Board of Administration of the Retirement System had excluded the period in computing applicants length
of service, and as a general proposition courts are inviting trouble
when they substitute their judgment for that of an administrative
agency on such matters.

